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UNPLANNED OBSOLESCENCE: THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
MEETS THE INTERNET
John D. Podesta*
I. INTRODUCTION
Standing in the Main Reading Room of the Library of Congress on
February 8, with TV cameras rolling, using a futuristic electronic pen
to zap his signature across the Net, President Clinton signed the Tele-
communications Act of 1996 (1996 Act or Act) into law.' The Act
ushered in the prospect of a new world not only for the major industry
players but also for the creators and consumers of the information
revolution. At the signing, the President proclaimed: "Today, with the
stroke of a pen, our laws will catch up with our future. We will help to
create an open marketplace where competition and innovation can
move as quick as light."2
That event was a long time coming. The history of this legislation
reads like a Hollywood epic movie script. A decade in the making,
spanning three administrations, five Congresses and a virtual revolu-
tion in the House of Representatives, the handiwork of literally
thousands of industry lobbyists, the bill finally came together under
the leadership of Speaker Newt Gingrich combined with the strong
will and guidance of Vice President Al Gore.
Think about it, all this simply to overcome the rather sensible judg-
ments and steady hand of one federal district court judge.3 What is
this proposed new world going to be like? Has Washington, in all its
collective wisdom, written the script for the next blockbuster Star
Wars or just the next bust Waterworld?
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A., Knox College, 1971; J.D.,
Georgetown University Law Center, 1976.
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-614 (West Supp. 1996).
2. President's Remarks on Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 215, 216 (Feb. 8, 1996) [hereinafter Remarks].
3. Judge Harold H. Greene presided over United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F.
Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), which
orchestrated the break-up of the AT&T monopoly. As a result, all challenges and subsequent
rulings on the compliance of the telecommunications industry are brought before and decided by
Judge Greene. The passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 shifts much of the legal
burden back into legislative and regulatory hands.
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I would like to offer two sets of thoughts. First, I offer some recent
history that gives rise to some predictions of how the new Telecommu-
nications Act may work (or not). Second, I want to discuss why the
Internet may provide a paradigm which leapfrogs the current debate.
Let's start with the predictions.
First, the only certain outcome is that the Act will generate an
abundance of hype and hot air from all industry segments.
Second, the murky legislative compromise contains the different
and sometimes competing goals of deregulation and promoting com-
petition. When forced to confront the difficult task of choosing be-
tween these two goals, regulators are likely to follow Congress's lead
and punt, doing a little of both and thereby achieving neither.
Third, the legislation is going to reinforce the major economic trend
fueling this year's presidential debate-middle class wage earners, in
this case ratepayers, are likely to pay more so that the better off and
better educated can better enjoy the fruits of their capital. As for the
poor, like in most areas of public policy today, they will be further left
out and left behind.
Fourth, for the next decade, the competitive fight over the provision
of telecommunications services will be less about driving down the
price to consumers and more about adding power and performance-
that is, more bandwidth, functionality, etc. Those who have just
junked a perfectly good two-year-old PC for one with more RAM, a
bigger hard drive and faster modem, know the distinction that I'm
trying to draw.
Finally, as a recent cover of Business Week concerning the software
industry proclaimed, "The Web Changes Everything."'4 Those with
even a passing familiarity with the Communications Decency Act
(CDA), commonly referred to as the Exon Amendment,5 know that
4. Amy Cortese, The Software Revolution, Bus. WK., Dec. 4, 1995.
5. On June 9, 1995, Republican Senator James Exon introduced an amendment to the Com-
munications Decency Act (CDA), which has since been incorporated into the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996. 141 CONG. REC. S8087-92 (daily ed. June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon);
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §§ 501-09, 110 Stat. 56, 133-39
(1996) (to be codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). The measure seeks to combat the
transmission of obscene, indecent and harassing material through telecommunications technolo-
gies. Shortly after President Clinton signed the new legislation into law, a broad coalition of
privacy, free speech and consumer advocates across the country filed suit in federal district court
challenging the constitutionality of several provisions of the CDA. See ACLU v. Reno, No. 96-
963, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1617 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 1996) (consolidating ACLU and American
Library Association cases challenging the CDA). A three-judge panel of the district court, sit-
ting pursuant to the special jurisdictional provision of the CDA to consider constitutional chal-
lenges, 47 U.S.C.A § 561(a), held that the sections of the law applying criminal penalties to the
transmission of indecent communications and prohibiting sending of patently offensive messages
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the Congress does not get the Net. And a lot of citizens do not get
Congress, which is why they may have a few of their own thoughts
about how this new information world ought to be configured.
Recent telecommunication industry history, I believe, supports
these predictions. The telecommunications industries are experienc-
ing the kind of business environment computer companies have con-
fronted over the last twenty years, 6 a business environment where
executives have learned to cope with Moore's Law, a thesis by
Gordon Moore, founder of Intel, that computing power doubles every
eighteen months.7 This is exhilarating for some, but gut-wrenching for
many. The pace of technological change from analog to digital, from
wired to wireless, from snail speed to light speed, is pushing an in-
creased pace of change in new product and service offerings and in
industry structure.8 This is not a time for a group of industries suited
to the feint-hearted or the slow-footed. Both the telephone and cable
industries have responded to this new environment with market repo-
sitions and a public relations blitz that has forecast an information
through an interactive computer service to a person under 18 years of age violated the First and
Fifth Amendments. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The case is on appeal to
the Supreme Court of the United States. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996),
appeal docketed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3295 (U.S. Sept. 30, 1996) (No. 96-511).
6. See Alan Cane, A Program of Shake-Up and Shake-Out, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1987, at 10
(describing the history of the computer industry transition and predicting continuing effects of its
transitive nature).
7. The Interminablener. Why Is the Internet So Slow? And What Can Be Done About It?,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 1996, at 70.
8. The passage of the Telecommunications Act has triggered a series of mergers and acquisi-
tions in the telecommunications field. In early April, SBC Communications acquired the Pacific
Telesis Group for $17 billion, and three weeks later Bell Atlantic announced its $22 billion
merger with NYNEX, the fifth largest acquisition in American history. Mark Landler, Two Bell
Companies Agree to Merger Worth $17 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1996, at Al; Mark Landler,
NYNEX and Bell Atlantic Reach Accord on Merger; Links 36 Million Customers, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 1996, at Al; Mark Lander, A Sticking-to-Their-Knitting Deal; Nynex and Bell Atlantic
Decide They Are Truly Made for Each Other, N.Y. TIMES, April 23, 1996, at D1, D8; see also
Allan Sloan, The Corporate Elephant Man; To Dance with Wolves, Bloated IBM Must Learn
Smaller Steps, NEWSDAY, Dec. 8, 1991, at 84 (contrasting the shortcomings of IBM, which
avoided breaking into smaller components in 1982, and its difficulty surviving in the rapidly
changing computer industry with the successes of AT&T and the RBOCs, which underwent
separation at the same time, in remaining industry leaders in a similarly situated telecommunica-
tions industry).
Cross-industry mergers are becoming commonplace as RBOCs expand into other telecommu-
nications markets. For example, on February 27, 1996, US West announced it would acquire
Continental Cablevision, Inc., the nation's third largest cable company. Paul Farhi, Phone Giant
US West to Buy Cable TV Firm, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1996, at Cl; see also Paul Farhi, Media
Giants' Bedfellowship Raises Questions About Competition, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1996, at Hi, H9
(discussing the emerging pattern of partnerships and combinations among communications and
entertainment companies).
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nirvana for consumers.9 But, before everyone gets too excited, it is
important to listen to their rhetoric today and remember what they
were preaching in comparison to what they practiced just a few years
ago.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: VIDEO DIALTONE
Almost before the ink was dry on the Modification of Final Judg-
ment (MFJ) which broke up the pre-1982 Bell monopoly, the Re-
gional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) had promised a world of
new, enhanced, cheaper service-if only they could be relieved of the
restrictions imposed by the MFJ and especially if they could control
the content of what went over their wires.10 Not content with their a
role as traditional common carriers, simply hauling bits and bytes over
their plant and switches (a role, by the way, that recently has been
remarkably profitable), they longed to become video programmers
and compete, head-to-head, with the cable monopolies.
Regulatory restrictions, as well as a statutory bar, prohibited until
recently local exchange carriers from providing video programming
except in small, rural markets." The FCC, faced with both a desire to
9. See, e.g., Chuck Ross & John Motavalli, TCI Buys Stake in Microsoft Network, INSIDE ME-
DIA, Dec. 14, 1994, at 1 (announcing that Tele-Communications Inc., the nation's largest cable
operator, bought a major equity stake in Microsoft Network, an on-line consumer service); Jared
Sandberg, AT&T Buys Ziff s On-Line Service, Interchange, for More Than $50 Million, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 23, 1994, at B5 (reporting AT&T's purchase of Ziff Communication Co.'s In-
terchange Online Network, an on-line information service); Eben Shapiro, Time Warner Com-
pletes Turner Deal, and Focus Shifts to Cutting Costs, Debt, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 1996, at 1
(reporting on Time Warner's acquisition of Turner Broadcasting and its plans to spin off most of
its cable holdings); Thomas E. Weber, MCI Matches AT&T's Internet Offer of Free Access to
Long-Distance, Clients, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1996, at B3 (announcing MCI's aggressive plan to
compete with AT&T's Internet services).
10. In the years following the modified final judgment, the RBOCs made a series of efforts to
have the regulations amended to permit content control. "[T]he companies have been chanting
almost since the day of their birth in 1984: 'Free the Bells.' Free us to manufacture, to offer
long-distance lines, movies and on-line services .... " Mike Mills, The New Kings of Capitol Hill;
Regional Bells Use Lobbying Clout to Push for New Markets, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1995, at H1,
H5; see Eric J. Savitz, They've Come a Long Way and the Future Looks Bright as Well for the
Baby Bells, BARR.ON'S, Oct. 15, 1990, at 10, 11 (chronicling RBOC lobbying efforts and legal
challenges); see also Barton Crockett, RBHCs Pump Big Bucks Into U.K. Nets, NETWORK
WORLD, Dec. 3, 1990, at 1, 70 (explaining RBOC efforts in England to acquire expertise in
content delivery in anticipation of future application within the U.S.).
11. See In re Applications of Telephone Companies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel
Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, 21 F.C.C.2d 307, 325,
recons. in part, 22 F.C.C.2d 746 (1970), and affd sub nom., General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449
F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971) (restricting local exchange carrier (LEC) video programming through
regulation); 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1994) (restricting LEC video programming through statute).
The new telecommunications legislation repeals § 613(b) of the Communications Act, which
prohibited LECs from providing video programming directly to subscribers in their telephone
1996] UNPLANNED OBSOLESCENCE 1097
promote competition to the wired cable industry and a plea by the
telephone companies (telcos) to enter new competitive marketplaces,
struggled to construct a common carriage model that would allow the
telcos to provide cable-style programming over their wires, while si-
multaneously encouraging a rich diversity of content providers. 12 The
model was video dialtone. 13 As originally conceived in 1987, video
dialtone was intended to be an enriched version of video common car-
riage.14 Telcos would provide not only the underlying video transport
services, but could also provide a variety of user-friendly gateway fea-
tures.' 5 Video dialtone systems would support multiple programmers
and increase the ability of public access and educational programmers
to reach their audience. 16
Telcos initially rushed to embrace the high-tech, new-world infor-
mation common carrier model.' 7 Video dialtone became a rationale
for accelerating the building-out of high capacity infrastructure, espe-
cially fiber optics.' 8 Like defense contractors with a cost-plus con-
service area. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 613(b), 98 Stat.
2779, 2785, repealed by Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 302(b)(1), 110
Stat. 56, 124.
12. See In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections 63.54-
63.56, 2 F.C.C.R. 5092 (1987) (investigating whether cable-telco cross-ownership rules should be
modified); see also OFFICE OF PLANS AND POLICY, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
FCC POLICY ON CABLE OWNERSHIP (1981) (recommending continuation of the cable-telco
cross-ownership ban).
13. For a description of video dialtone and examination of the FCC's video dialtone decision,
see generally Terry L. Etter & Rick D. Rhodes, Sorting Through the Vision and Vagueness of the
FCC's Video Dialtone Decision, 1 COMMLAW CONSPECrus 56 (1993).
14. In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections 63.54 -
63.58, 7 F.C.C.R. 300, 306 (1991) [hereinafter First Report and Order]. Prior to modification of
the cross-ownership rules in the First and Second Report and Orders, RBOC's were not permit-
ted to exceed a "carrier-user" relationship with video programmers. 47 C.F.R. § 63.54(b), (c)
(1991), amended by 47 C.F.R. § 63.54(d) (1992). They were limited to common carriage provi-
sion of communications services and functions. Id.; see, e.g., Comark Cable Fund III v. North-
western Ind. Tel. Co., 100 F.C.C.2d 1244, 1255 (1985) (prohibiting a cable-telco affiliation where
the companies entered into pole rental and other business and financial agreements with respect
to construction and maintenance of cable television facilities).
15. First Report and Order, supra note 14, at 306, 319; see also United States v. Western Elec.
Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 603 (D.D.C. 1987) (removing the information services restriction to permit
LECs to provide gateway services).
16. See In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections 63.54 -
63.58, 7 F.C.C.R. 5781, 5783 n.3 (1992) [hereinafter Second Report and Order] (defining the basic
platform of a video dialtone system).
17. See Etter & Rhodes, supra note 13, at 67 (listing several LECs' plans to implement video
dialtone networks after the FCC's video dialtone decision in July 1992); Richard A. Gershon, Is
Video Dial Tone the Future of Telephone Programming?, TELEPHONY, Nov. 9, 1992, at 20 (exam-
ining LEC growth strategy of entering into video programming through video dialtone).
18. Rich Brown, Bell May Roll Its Own Programming, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 25,
1993, at 32 (stating that between 1993 and 1999, New Jersey Bell is projected to spend $1.5
billion to upgrade its system to fiber optic cable); Dawn Bushaus, Convergence Clairvoyance,
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tract, telcos were not shy about seeking ways to justify a higher cost
structure that translated into larger profits.19 Combining the need for
cable competition with the need to hotwire the country, telcos
trumpeted video dialtone as the most promising means to open the
video programming market. Video dialtone meant the potential of
increased competition with cable, increased distribution channels for
cable programmers and increased performance and service for con-
sumers. Of course, this was offset by the specter that the telephone
ratepayers would fund a major enhancement of the infrastructure that
many people would never want or need.20
Behind this push were predicted technological advances that could
allow, for example, a telco with upgraded fiber optic and coaxial cable
wiring to offer access to between three and five hundred video chan-
nels, a marked expansion from the eighty channel capacity of the ana-
log cable systems then being used by cable companies. 21 Telcos were
well-positioned to capitalize on enhanced technologies to improve
public access to interactive audio, video and data services.
COMM. WK., Feb. 7, 1994, at PNU3, PNU6 (recounting Ameritech's Project Looking Glass, a $1
billion fiber deployment effort launched in 1992 that tripled the amount of fiber optic technology
in its network).
19. See In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections 63.54-
63.58, 3 F.C.C.R. 5849, 5854-55 (1988) (explaining LEC arguments for removing the cross-own-
ership ban and permitting them to offer expanded services). Bill Redderson, former vice-presi-
dent of marketing at BellSouth explained, "'The challenge is to grow the base .... You have to
make the network more and more intelligent, adding features, functionality and value for the
customer."' Savitz, supra note 10, at 26 (quoting Mr. Redderson). Author Eric Savitz com-
ments, "in other words, find a way to boost the average customer's bill without raising the price
of basic service." Id. Similarly, enlarging the cost structure inspired telco arguments to dis-
tribute cable television. Noting the circular justifications used by the RBOCs, another commen-
tator has explained, "To provide advanced services, [the Baby Bells] say they need to run high-
capacity, fiber-optic lines. But to justify that cost, they assert, [that] the lines must carry cable
TV, too." Peter Coy, Can Judge Greene Pacify the Baby Bells?, Bus. WK., Apr. 29, 1991, at 92.
Although resting on unsteady foundations, telco arguments to extend the cost structure were not
without economic force. The technological advances allowing telcos to commingle digital media
are also bringing pressure to bear upon existing pricing systems. As Nicholas Negroponte co-
gently observed, "[T]he entire economic model of pricing in telecommunications is about to fall
apart. Today's tariffs are determined per minute, per mile, or per bit, all three of which are
rapidly becoming bogus measures." NICHOLAs NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 77 (1995).
20. One commentator writes:
[E]xisting capacity is enough for most phone customers. Even if everyone does benefit
from an upgraded network, it would still be a much sounder idea to have only users of
new services pay for them. This would force the phone companies to enter hot new
VDT [video dialtone] markets the old-fashioned way-through investment, rather than
through milking their regulated monopolies.
Mark Lewyn, The Phony Argument from the Baby Bells, Bus. WK., Oct. 31, 1994, at 52.
21. Larry Stark, HFC Networks: Interactive and Inexpensive, TELEPHONY, June 19, 1995, at 36,
38, 42.
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However, while telcos hyped video dialtone's public interest poten-
tial for open competition, cable companies began to sound like con-
sumer advocates, warning against potential threats to the American
public. First, they insisted that telcos be preempted from passing
video dialtone implementation costs onto all ratepayers.22 Although
refurbishing existing infrastructure to permit video dialtone capacity
would affect all phone lines, many Americans would not subscribe,
they said, to the expanded service. Thus, de facto cross-subsidization
of the infrastructure by telephone subscribers would spread improve-
ment costs to parties who would not receive any benefits. Real con-
sumer advocates urged lawmakers and regulators not only to guard
against cross-subsidies, but also to ensure equal access and speech di-
versity in light of the potential for corporate dominance of the new
multimedia systems.23 Perhaps proving that consumers really had
something to fear, telcos, while eager to enter the video programming
market, warned against a regulatory scheme that would limit their
ability to recover their costs from subscribers, which in turn might pre-
clude significant upgrades in services. 24
In the early nineties, the FCC began to seriously consider the regu-
latory scheme for video common carriage. Telcos would be permitted
to offer common carriage services and be required to offer multiple
video information providers access to their platform in a nondiscrimi-
natory fashion.25 Common carrier status freed telcos from being regu-
lated as cable service providers.26 As a result, they would not be
subjected to the franchising obligations and fees of cable companies. 27
This regulatory decision, while creating tremendous opportunities for
22. In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections 63.54-
63.58, 10 F.C.C.R. 244, 246 (1994). "The cable industry is concerned that telcos will use revenue
from their regular customers to subsidize their entry into the video business .... The National
Cable Television Association argues that despite the government's best efforts, the threat of
cross-subsidy remains." Christopher Stern, Crossownership Ban to Supreme Court; But Congress
Is About to Eliminate the Cable/Telco Restriction in Telecom Bill, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
Nov. 27, 1995, at 18.
23. Comments of Center for Media Education et al., at 4-5, In re Telephone Company-Cable
Television Cross-Ownership Rule, Sections 63.54-63.58, (FCC) (CC No. 87-266) (filed Mar. 21,
1995); see also Second Report and Order, supra note 16, at 5802-04. In implementing video
dialtone, the FCC concluded that its regulatory framework should be guided by three key objec-
tives: equal access, regulatory flexibility and ease of use. Id. at 5804. The FCC believed that the
nondiscrimination objective of equal access would "substantially further our diversity goal by
fostering a diversity of video services without regard to the control of such information." Id.
24. Etter & Rhodes, supra note 13, at 60; see Second Report & Order, supra note 16, at 5842-
43 (describing telco arguments requiring additional incentives to justify developing and de-
ploying an advanced telecommunications infrastructure).
25. Second Report & Order, supra note 16, at 5783.
26. First Report and Order, supra note 14, at 312.
27. Id. at 324-28.
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the telcos, represented a cautious middle ground toward telco en-
trance into video programming distribution.
In light of public interest concerns, telcos were permitted to offer
transport services, but not content services. They were limited to no
more than a five percent ownership interest in any video information
programmer and were prohibited from purchasing existing cable com-
panies in their service territories to prevent them from providing
video dialtone service indirectly. 28 Fears of inequitable repair services
and inadequate connections for competitors kept the FCC from al-
lowing telcos into video programming.29 Even former Secretary of
Education William Bennett, a prominent supporter of content restric-
tions in the publishing and entertainment industries, has warned,
"Any democrat... has to be wary of the concentration of power ....
When you're talking about the images, ideas, imagination and opin-
ions of a country, more sources are better than fewer."'30
Those fears of anticompetitive conduct were of course well-
founded. Last October for example, the Wall Street Journal reported
on the RBOCs' stiff-arming of would-be local exchange market ri-
vals.31 Uncomfortable with the prospect of similar control over the
emerging telecommunications markets, the video dialtone model pro-
hibited telcos from competing as both distributors and program prov-
iders.32 However, these regulatory limitations were hardly the subject
of protest, as the telcos were pleased to be admitted into a market ripe
with opportunity.
That position did not last long. Shortly after the telcos began to
submit their trial video dialtone plans to the FCC for approval, they
28. Second Report & Order, supra note 16, at 5819 (ownership interest); id. at 5837-38 (acqui-
sition of existing cable systems).
29. Etter & Rhodes, supra note 13, at 60. The authors cite one example in which the Georgia
Public Utilities Commission found BellSouth to have unnecessarily delayed provision of a voice-
messaging service until it was ready to establish its own competing service. Id.
30. Farhi, supra note 8, at Hi, H9.
31. Leslie Cauley, Calls Waiting: Rivals Are Hung Up on Baby Bells' Control over Local Mar-
ket, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 1995, at Al. RBOC efforts range from the severe to the sophomoric.
For example, in a Justice Department complaint, LCI International claimed that US West shut
off service to 4,000 of its customers and informed inquiring customers that LCI was out-of-busi-
ness, causing 24% of LCI's customers to cancel their service. Id. at A6. Tactics employed by
Ameritech against would-be rival US Signal included a proposal to the FCC requesting that
Ameritech be permitted to charge rivals $20.37 per month plus $.082 cents per call for customers
who wanted to switch to competitors without undergoing a phone number change. Id. Bell
Atlantic employed less sophisticated means to forestall competition. While working on equip-
ment housed in space rented from Bell Atlantic, MFS Communications employees were denied
use of a restroom because FCC regulations did not require it. Id.
32. See Second Report and Order, supra note 16, at 5806-12 (outlining the two-tiered video
dialtone model).
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began to abandon their self-proclaimed vision as twenty-first century
distribution providers. Instead, telco lobbyists pushed for additional
entry into the market for video information programming and equip-
ment services.33 They began to create joint ventures with other telcos
and with entertainment giants like Disney and Time Warner to ex-
pand their market access, to combine their resources and to position
themselves as content providers. 34 At the same time, they initiated a
series of lawsuits seeking access into the content programming market
as a First Amendment right.35 Finally, they persuaded many regula-
tors to relieve them of the burden of rate-of-return regulation in favor
of price caps. 36
Successful with First Amendment challenges in court and successful
in seeking price cap rules from regulators, the local exchange carriers'
(LECs) enthusiasm to build multiprogrammer platforms and to serve
solely as a value-added transport service quickly waned. Abandoning
their multiple programmer approach, BOC after BOC decided that
they really would rather be cable companies, and simply dropped
plans to provide video dialtone service.37 The era of multiprogram-
mer platforms seemed over. Faced with this history and still wanting
to find some way to encourage multiprogrammer platforms, Congress
chose the carrot instead of the stick. Stating that it intended to en-
courage competition, Congress in the 1996 Act gave LECs the option
of entering the video content market as wireless operators under a
33. Mills, supra note 10, at H1.
34. For example, Ameritech, BellSouth and SBC Communications formed a programming
and packaging alliance with Disney. Fred Dawson, Ameritech Corp. Lays Out Deliberate VDT
Strategy, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Nov. 14, 1994, at 1. The alliance allows the RBOCs to package
analog and video-on-demand services, to develop content and marketing services, and to estab-
lish a technical platform. Id. Bell Atlantic, NYNEX and Pacific Bell have fashioned a similar
venture with Hollywood's Creative Artists Agency. Id. By forming alliances with large en-
tertainment companies like Disney and CAA, RBOCs are assured full access to video program-
ming. Id.
35. See, e.g., US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1994); Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994); BellSouth Corp. v. United States,
868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994); Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill.
1994).
36. See In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 5 F.C.C.R. 6786
(1990), on recons., 6 F.C.C.R. 2637 (1991) (implementing price cap regulation for interstate serv-
ices of LECs).
37. For example, in July, 1995, Ameritech abandoned its video dialtone plans and moved to a
cable model. Shira McCarthy, Ameritech Switches Network Plans, TELEPHONY, July 3, 1995, at 6.
It has been further reported that numerous telcos are currently evaluating other options, includ-
ing the buying of cable franchises and becoming local cable television operators. Shira McCar-
thy, Regulations Imperil Video Dialtone, TELEPHONY, May 8, 1995, at 7, 16.
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newly deregulated regime, as cable operators, or under a newly highly
deregulated scheme called "open video systems" (OVS).38
III. OPEN VIDEO SYSTEMS
Under the new Act, OVS operators are relieved of the regulatory
requirements imposed on common carriers under Title II of the Com-
munications Act and relieved of many of the regulatory requirements
cable operators face.39 In exchange for this reduced regulatory bur-
den, OVS operators are obliged to provide carriage to nonaffiliated
programmers, conditioned on fair and reasonable rates and condi-
tions; where programmer demand for carriage exceeds supply, an
OVS operator cannot control more than one-third of the system chan-
nel capacity.40
In authorizing OVS, Congress was attempting to create an attrac-
tive alternative to spur telephone companies to enter the video mar-
ketplace. But, in doing so, Congress seems to have chosen a model
that does not merely seek head-to-head intersystem competition with
the cable industry, but is intended to further public interest goals.
Congress intended OVS to provide greater diversity of programming,
increased consumer choice, lower consumer rates and increased in-
vestment in high-end infrastructure through the vehicle of an "open"
multiprogrammer platform, thus creating a video programming deliv-
ery market that operates in the public interest.41 Congress has offered
telephone companies relief from some regulatory requirements in ex-
change for providing intrasystem competition and proper support for
and allocation of channels for schools and universities, churches, non-
profit entities and local governments. 4 2 Congress clearly intended to
use this model as a means of fostering a system that would provide the
public with the benefits of programming diversity that ought to flow
from a platform open to unaffiliated programmers seeking to reach
consumers.
Having offered telephone companies the "quid" of reduced regula-
tion, Congress delegated to the Federal Communications Commission
the difficult task of setting forth the "quo" of responsibilities that tele-
phone companies will have to meet to prevent improper subsidization,
38. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 571-73.
39. Id. § 573(c).
40. Id. § 573(a).
41. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 458, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 175-79 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 188-92.
42. See Chris McConnell, Open Video Systems Open to Debate, BROADCASTINO & CABLE,
Apr. 8, 1996, at 18 (noting the FCC's proposal to.apply must-carry and public, educational and
governmental channel rules to OVS providers).
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preserve rights of carriage for educational, governmental and other
nonprofit groups and prevent non-affiliated programmers from being
denied carriage improperly through unfair rates or conditions. The
Act required the Commission to complete the regulatory framework
for OVS, including resolving any petitions for reconsideration, within
six months of enactment. 43 The FCC responded by implementing a
lightning-fast notice and comment process, 44 which had to resolve a
host of complex questions including the following:
" What is an "open video system" since there is no definition in
the Act?
" Can cable operators and wireless cable operators convert to the
OVS model?
" How can the FCC implement a certification process that gives
OVS operators a right to a decision that they are in compliance
with FCC rules within ten days of submission?
" What safeguards, including structural safeguards, are appropri-
ate to prevent telephone companies from cross-subsidizing OVS
buildouts?
" Can market-based mechanisms ensure rates, access and alloca-
tion of channels that are fair, reasonable and not unjustly
discriminatory?
* What rules are necessary to ensure that OVS platforms provide
the same access and support to public education and govern-
mental entities as cable operators?
* Can OVS operators be required to provide discounted rates to
not-for-profit programmers to ensure diversity of programming
in the video marketplace?
In answering these questions, regulators faced a Hobson's choice.
If they regulate to protect the interests of consumers and unaffiliated
programmers, LECs will abandon OVS in favor of cable or wireless
cable. If they fail to guard against LEC abuses in the name of encour-
aging competition, OVS will breed unfair competition. This, in the
long run, will result in less competition.
The responses to the FCC's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking high-
light the dilemma faced by the Commission and the failure. of Con-
gress to embrace a strategy of favoring entry by LECs into the
marketplace through a multiprogrammer platform. The comments of
local exchange carriers demand that the Commission "minimize rules
and maximize flexibility" and "not attempt to second-guess the good
faith business judgment of telephone companies" or else the carriers
43. 47 U.S.C.A. § 653(c)(2)(A).
44. On March 11, 1996 the FCC issued its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking requesting com-
ment on issues concerning the implementation of the OVS provisions of the Act. 61 Fed. Reg.
10,496 (1996). Filed comments were due no later than April 1, and reply comments were due no
later than April 11. Id.
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will simply abandon OVS for the traditional cable model. 45 Cable in-
dustry comments stress eliminating potential regulatory advantages
OVS operators have over cable competitors46 and suggest that the
FCC "impose and strictly enforce a letter perfect" requirement for
OVS certification.47 Representatives of the public interest community
warn the Commission that without an effective regulatory frame-
work-including requirements that video programming be delivered
through a fully separated subsidiary, that LECs comply with strict cost
allocation procedures, that the Commission adopt market tests to en-
sure fair rates and access, that not-for-profit programmers receive dis-
counted rates to promote diversity and that operators' buildout
capacity to meet demand-that OVS will "simply become 'cable-
lite'," and a single programmer, the telephone company, will control
the vast percentage of channel capacity while simultaneously receiving
the benefit of reduced regulation.4 8 This debate is little more than a
recycling of the arguments made during the FCC's video dialtone pro-
ceedings. Without a clear preference for an "open" system, Congress
merely recreated the same old industry conflicts in a new forum. As
one Capitol Hill attorney who helped draft the legislation recently ad-
mitted, "It's not entirely clear that we knew what we were doing."49
IV. LOCAL Loop COMPETITION
While Congress failed to embrace a clear vision in the video mar-
ketplace, the same cannot be said with regard to the provision of local
exchange service. There the policy goal is straightforward-dismantle
the local telephone monopolies, through interconnection and un-
bundling of the local loop and promoting real competition in the local
telephone market.50 The Telecommunications Act brings a number of
rigorous directives to bear to achieve these goals. In addition to obli-
45. Comments of Bell Atlantic at iv, 6, In re Implementation of Section 302 of the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996 (FCC) (CS No. 96-46).
46. Comments and Petition for Reconsideration of the National Cable Television Association,
Inc. at 2-3, In re Implementation of Section 302 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (FCC)
(CS No. 96-46).
47. Comments of Tele-Communications, Inc. at 2, In re Implementation of Section 302 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (FCC) (CS No. 96-46).
48. Comments of Alliance for Community Media at 3-4, In re Implementation of Section 302
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (FCC) (CS No. 96-46) [hereinafter Comments of Alli-
ance]; see also Open Video Rules Watched Closely, Telcos Hail OVS as Successor to Burdensome
Video Dialtone, INTERACTIVE VIDEO NEWS, Apr. 15, 1996 (expressing concern that OVS will
become simply "cable-lite").
49. Chris Nolan, Is Everybody Happy?, CABLEVISION, Apr. 29, 1996, at 86.
50. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 251-61 (delineating provisions to introduce competition into the local tele-
phone service market).
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gating every carrier to interconnect with the facilities and equipment
of other carriers, provisions in the Act place a series of requirements
on incumbent local exchange carriers designed to open the local mar-
ket to competition. LECs must:
1. Allow resale of telecommunications services, priced at
wholesale. 51
2. Provide number portability, limited to same location, to the ex-
tent technically feasible.52
3. Provide dialing parity to competing providers of exchange and
toll service.53
4. Provide access to poles, ducts, rights-of-way.54
5. Enter into reciprocal compensation arrangements. 55
6. Negotiate interconnection agreements in good faith.56
7. Provide to other carriers interconnection with the network at
any technically feasible point.57
8. Offer unbundled "network elements" at any technically feasible
point.58
9. Offer for resale at wholesale rates any telecommunications ser-
vice offered by the LEC to subscribers who are not carriers.5 9
10. Provide notice of changes that affect interconnection and in-
teroperability of networks.60
11. Allow collocation of equipment of interconnecting carriers.61
Illinois has been at the forefront of states trying to bring competi-
tion into local telephone service.62 However, the results of Illinois'
initiative suggest that government's good intentions can be easily
thwarted when met with a big stall from the dominant monopoly. Us-
ing tactics ranging from failing to facilitate collocation of equipment,
to withholding detailed right-of-way maps, to charging excessive fees
to implement number portability, Illinois Bell, like other BOCs, has
forestalled competition thus far.63 Unlike Illinois, however, most state
regulators have failed thus far to even put in place the ground rules
51. Id. § 251 (b)(1).
52. Id. § 251(b)(2).
53. Id. § 251(b)(3).
54. Id. § 251(b)(4).
55. Id. § 251(b)(5).
56. Id. § 251(c)(1).
57. Id. § 251(c)(2)(B).
58. Id. § 251 (c)(3).
59. Id. § 251(c)(4)(A).
60. Id. § 251(c)(5).
61. Id. § 251(c)(6).
62. See Cauley, supra note 31, at Al (reporting that Ameritech was the first RBOC to em-
brace opening up the local market); Richard Ringer, Ameritech Will Accept Competition; Phone
Move in Illinois May Spur Deregulation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.9, 1995, at D4 (providing a brief his-
tory of Illinois regulatory efforts).
63. Cauley, supra note 31, at Al, A6.
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for local competition. A recent report by the FCC Common Carrier
Bureau found that competition for local exchange services was occur-
ring in only seven states, although fifteen others had established regu-
latory framework for local competition.64 The combination of the
LEC capacity to slow walk the competition process in practice and
congressionally imposed deadlines to complete the deregulatory pro-
cess, has driven most potential competitors in the local exchange
market to limit, or at least delay, committing wired local loop
alternatives.65
The most promising infrastructure alternative to the LEC monopoly
on local exchange services once looked to be the fiber-coaxial hybrid
network architecture pushed by the cable industry.66 Indeed, the
Dingell-Brooks Bill, which passed the House in the last Congress,
rather specifically embraced this two-wire vision as a national goal. 67
But, the uncertainty of practical interconnection, combined with the
major drain of revenue from the cable industry that resulted from the
1992 Cable Act, has forced the industry to slow implementation of
that system.68
For example, Sprint Telecommunications Venture (STV), the joint
venture between Sprint, TCI, Cox and Comcast, which originally
sought to upgrade cable systems to provide competitive voice grade
telephony, has refocused its strategy almost completely to providing
stand-alone PCS service. 69 The alliance's name recently changed to
Sprint Spectrum, reflecting this wireless focus. 70 Similarly, less than a
month after the 1996 Act was passed, Continental Cable deciding it
would rather switch than fight, announced its merger with US West.71
64. Telephony, COMM. DAILY, Apr. 11, 1996, at 6.
65. See James Flanigan, AT&T Breakup II, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1995, at D1 (explaining the
significance of AT&T's acquisition of McCaw Cellular and focus on wireless entry into the local
telephone market through a break-up subsidiary); see also Cindy Skrzycki, MCI Unveils Wireless
Service Plan; FCC Urged to Award License to Consortium, WASH. POST, July 30, 1993, at D1
(reporting that MCI has a similar wireless plan to capture personal communications services
market share including local telephone markets).
66. Pradeep Gupta & Dilip Limaye, Cable's Fiber/Coax Network Is Answer for Utilities, MUL-
TICHANNEL NEWS, Mar. 21, 1994, at 49; Time Warner Joins TCG As Cable Operators Pursue
Telephony, FCC REP., Dec. 15, 1993.
67. H.R. 3626, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
68. See David Lieberman, TCI Shifts Battle from Phone Rivals to Satellite, USA TODAY, Oct.
28, 1996, at 6B (reporting that TCI is trial testing whether providing telephone service via cable
is financially viable).
69. Mark Landler, An Aerial Assault on the Wired Nation; Airwaves Are Ammunition of
Choice Against Phone and Cable Targets, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 1996, at D1, D5.
70. Id.; Mike Mills, Sprint Promotes LeMay; Alliance Name Change Heralds Wireless Focus,
WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1996, at B3.
71. Paul Farhi, Phone Giant U.S. West To Buy Cable TV Firm, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1996, at
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The 1996 Act does at least open the possibility of competition in the
wired world through a route other than wireless or a huge capital in-
vestment in stringing new fiber or upgrading existing cable systems.
Namely, the Act requires LECs to provide service at a wholesale price
for the purpose of resale.72 Remember, that is how MCI got a foot-
hold in the long-distance market.73 Providing a long-distance, wireless
Internet access and a resold local land line services package may be
the most viable option for AT&T and MCI to enter the local exchange
market as they seek to fend off the RBOC's entry into long distance.
That strategy, if successfully implemented, could put significant down-
ward pressure on the price of telecommunications services. That strat-
egy, though, can only be successful if there is diligent implementation
of the Act's mandate to resell by federal and state regulators. 74
V. EFFECT ON CONSUMERS
Will this predicted competition help consumers? There is no evi-
dence of competitive fear in the RBOCs' recent proposal to the FCC
to raise local phone bills by about ten dollars over the next several
years.75 The telcos argue that the increases would be counteracted by
decreasing costs for other services; but, Congress intended to reduce
overall consumer costs, not to grant leeway for creative rate adjust-
ment. Balanced against the potential for competition, with all its at-
tendant practical difficulty, is the potential for inappropriate cross-
subsidies, which are practically impossible to police.76 The LECs have
every reason to allocate as much cost as they can to monopoly services
72. 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(c)(4)(a).
73. The FCC awarded MCI a $1.8 billion judgment and held that AT&T was required to offer
bulk capacity on its circuits for resale to third party carriers in 1981. As a result, resale common
carriers were born, providing geographically-restricted service through lines leased from AT&T.
Guy de Jonquieres, Explosion of Competition in U.S. Long-Distance Service, FrN. TIMES, Oct. 24,
1983, at § 3, VI.
74. The FCC's efforts to implement the Act, encourage competition and remove barriers to
entry hit a roadblock recently when the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
issued an order staying the pricing provisions the Commission adopted in its local competition
order. See Iowa Utilities Bd. v. FCC, Nos. 96-3321, 96-3406, 96-3436, 96-3414, 96-3416, 96-3410,
96-3430, 96-3418, 96-3424, 1996 WL 589204 (8th Cir. Oct. 15, 1996) (staying certain provisions of
In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of
1996, (FCC 96-325), (Aug. 29, 1996)).
75. Mike Mills, Phone Firms Seek Higher Local Rates; Average Bill Would Rise $10 Month to
Subsidize Service, WASH. POST, May 7, 1996, at Al.
76. Cross-subsidization occurs when a firm shifts the costs of production in a competitive mar-
ket into production in a market where it maintains a monopoly. Thus, LECs have an economic
incentive to assign costs of their other businesses to their local telephone exchange business.
This practice would be especially difficult to detect where monopoly and competitive services
share distribution facilities.
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to subsidize competitive ventures. Using ratepayer money and under
the guise of building intracompany communications, the RBOC's
have already built interLATA facilities capable of handling most, if
not all, of today's in-region long-distance traffic. 77 Prior to the pas-
sage of the Act, they filed court challenges to the FCC's streamlined
Section 214 procedure for building stand alone cable systems. 78 Those
challenges were based on flimsy First Amendment arguments, but the
Section 214 proceeding, however streamlined, was just about the only
protection against improper cross-subsidization. Whether the LECs
choose OVS, stand-alone cable or wireless cable as their means to
enter the video programming business, without diligent policing to en-
sure against cross-subsidies, ratepayers are likely to pay the price and
bear the risk.
Those at the bottom of the economic ladder are likely to be particu-
larly hurt since they both can least afford to absorb the cost and are
least likely to receive the benefit of high end competitive services. To
add insult to injury to the country's poor, Congress deleted the rela-
tively strong antiredlining provisions in both the House and Senate
bills in favor of general antidiscrimination language with no clear en-
forcement mechanism.79 Even the much ballyhooed Snow-Rockefel-
ler universal service provisions,8 0 which are intended to provide low-
cost service to schools, libraries and rural health facilities, are likely to
benefit more upscale citizens, since you need something to plug into
the low-cost jack even if the jack is available.8' The Congress that
passed Snow-Rockefeller with one hand made significant cuts in the
77. DANIEL L. BRENNER, LAW AND REGULATION OF COMMON CARRIERS IN THE COMMUNI-
CATIONS INDUSTRY 13 (2d ed. 1996); see Bill Pietrucha, MCI Claims Regional Bells Have
Charged Inflated Access Fees, NEWSBYTES, July 22, 1996 (reporting that RBOCs have been build-
ing excess infrastructure since divestiture in anticipation of being allowed to enter the long-
distance and video markets and these networks have been financed by charging ratepayers in-
flated access charges).
78. See, e.g., Ameritech Operating Cos. v. FCC, No. 95-1441, (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 25, 1995).
79. Redlining refers to the practice of drawing the boundaries of video service provision to
exclude communities based on certain socio-economic features. The House bill contained provi-
sions prohibiting video platform discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, race or income. H.R.
1555, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 653(b)(1)(G) (1995). The Senate bill contained provisions prohib-
iting common carrier service discrimination on the basis of rural location or income. S. 652,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 253A(a) (1995) (enacted). However, the final Act contains only general
universal service principles on which regulators are "to base policies for the preservation and
advancement of universal service." 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(b).
80. 47 U.S.C.A. § 254.
81. The Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service set up to make recommendations to
the FCC on implementation did recommend greater discounts for economically disadvantaged
schools as part of its universal service recommendations. In re Federal-State Joint Board on
Universal Service (FCC) (CC No. 96-45) (Nov. 7, 1996), at 226.
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Technology in the Schools program with the other.82 It is hard to see
how financially strapped local governments can pick up that slack.
VI. THE INTERNET PARADIGM
If this review of the legislation seems overly negative or pessimistic,
I would offer this consolation: technology, and especially the Internet,
is about to sweep past this legislation and make it obsolete. Once
again, Congress has legislated with all eyes firmly fixed on the rear
view mirror. The battles fought in this legislation were conceived of
and framed prior to the phenomenal growth in the Net and especially
the advent of the World Wide Web, the graphical subnetwork on the
Internet. As Business Week noted: "The Web Changes Everything. '8 3
When the President signed Senate Bill 652 into law, he said the fol-
lowing: "Today our world is being remade yet again by an information
revolution, changing the way we work, the way we live, the way we
relate to each other. Already the revolution is so profound that it is
changing the dominant economic model of the age."8' But Congress
conceptualized the Net as little more than something that arrives at
your e-mail box in a plain brown wrapper.85 Congress failed to appre-
ciate the power of the Net, the power to enable individuals, the power
to democratize, the power to create new publishers and broadband
producers, the power to narrowcast and create small but viable audi-
ences, and the power to be interactive. All of these powers were lost
on legislators who simply had never been to cyberspace. What is
more, Congress failed to understand the potential of the Net to decon-
struct the existing industry structure. Aside from hooking up schools
and libraries, and with the rather major exception of censorship, Con-
gress simply legislated as if the Net were not there.
More attuned to what is really going on in the world, Wall Street
has understood that the Net is where the action is. Promising a world
that is richer than movies on demand, or even 500 channels of video
programmed by some mind-numbing mass media company, investors
82. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 104-19, 109 Stat. 194, 216-17
(1995) (rescinding funds previously made available under Public Law 103-333 to the Department
of Education for school reforms and various education programs).
83. Cortese, supra note 4.
84. Remarks, supra note 2, at 216.
85. Congress's attempt at Internet content regulation through the Communications Decency
Act illustrates the difficulty members have in both conceptualizing and governing Internet com-
munications. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing the Exon Amendment).
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have rushed into Net stock.86 Not just a phenomenon confined to hot
startups like Netscape, all of the major software industry players are
betting that the Net will revolutionize how we work, how we play,
how we create and how we communicate. Even mighty Microsoft,
having been slow to catch the Net wave, has recently reorganized its
company to focus on Internet-based networked computing.87 IBM's
Lotus, the leader in intranetworking software, suffered a blow re-
cently when it lost its alliance with AT&T, and is rushing to stay rele-
vant in an era where software applets are available on the Net.88
Oracle is betting that a $500 Net appliance will finally shake the
Microsoft/Intel grip on the PC market.89
What does this mean to the traditional telecommunications indus-
try? Everything. A good deal of the growth in revenues in the tradi-
tional telephone business has been the unexpected (unexpected to the
LECs, that is) surge of two- and three-line households.90 That's not
just a lot of pre-teenagers ordering their first Princess phones. That's
America plugging in and getting on-line.
What do Americans find when they get there? A lot that is cool. A
lot that is new. And a lot that is really slow. There are two reasons
why the Internet is slow. First, the rather anarchic nature of the Net
itself, with no central command, makes the Net's routing system ineffi-
cient at times. "Host contacted: waiting to connect" has replaced the
blinking 12:00 on VCRs as the electronic symbol people hate the
most. The Net techno-town hall is going to have to solve that prob-
lem, perhaps with some adjustments to the copyright law.91 Second,
86. See The Internet Grows on the Stock Market, and Vice Versa; Web Software Firms Share
Offer Is Hit, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1996, at G1 (describing the soaring prices of initial public
offerings of Internet-related stock).
87. John Markoff, Microsoft Sets a Revamping to Gain Edge on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
20. 1996, at DI.
88. Laurence Zuckerman, AT&T Plans to Discontinue Network Notes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29,
1996, at D4. The alliance has since been restored, though in a reworked fashion. Laurence
Zuckerman, AT&T and IBM Notes Alliance Is on Again, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1996, at Dl.
89. Peter H. Lewis, Doubts About the Fantasy of a $500 'Network PC', N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27,
1995, at D3.
90. Mark Landler, Multiple Family Phone Lines, A Postwar U.S. Trend, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26,
1995, at Al. In 1995, the percentage of households with more than one telephone line doubled
to 16%-the largest single-year increase in new residential phone lines since the end of World
War 1I. Id. The information superhighway segment is propelling this increase in demand. Id. at
D2. Some predict that by the year 2000, as many as half the nation's households will have two or
more phone lines. Id. at Al.
91. The technical nature of the World Wide Web involves the creation of copies for purposes
of storing and forwarding information to its end user. Cyberspace Law Institute, Copyright Law
on the Internet: The Special Problem of Caching and Copyright Protection (Draft) (1995), avail-
able on the Internet at http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/lc/cli.html. Certain techniques such as
"caching" of Web pages (temporarily storing the page on a hard drive to enhance performance)
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and more significant, is the Net's inability to move bits at a high
enough rate-a problem of lack of bandwidth. Moving graphics, as
opposed to text, audio files, and especially video files, requires the
transport of huge amounts of data.92 That problem is going to be
solved by telecommunications transport companies.
Competition is going to fix the bandwidth problem. The cable in-
dustry is promising a cable modem fifty times faster than high-end
telephone modems currently available for PCs. 93 The telephone in-
dustry, which for a long time ignored ISDN, and then priced it out of
the consumer market, are now trying to counter cable modems with
new compression technologies like ADSL/HDSL that promise deliv-
ery of full motion video over the copper plant.94
raise questions about copyright liability, which are currently being considered Congress. Id.; see
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRAsTRuCruRE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995); H.R. 2441, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996); S. 1284, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1996). For a cogent analysis of proposed changes to copyright law, see David G. Post, Control-
ling Cybercopies; LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 8, 1996, at 39.
92. See Loring 1. Wirbel, Communications Design, ELEC. ENGINEERING TIMES, March 4, 1996,
at 45 ("Everyone agrees that analog modems... will be increasingly inadequate to handle access
to Web pages with rich graphics .... But there is no single, clear evolutionary path to wideband
and broadband service .... ").
93. See Reinhardt Krause, Cable Modems Push into Set-Top Turf, ELEC. NEWS, Dec. 4, 1995,
at 1, 86. Reporting on developments at the Anaheim Western Cable Show showcasing cable
modems for PCs, Krause writes:
Most cable modems deployed for testing thus far have operated at about 10 Mbps,
but second- and third-generation units moving into deployment next year will offer
data speeds up to 30 Mbps. In comparison, leading-edge telephone modems operate at
28.8 Kbps over copper wiring; ISDN lines, which convert analog to digital, operate up
to 128 Kbps.
Id.
94. Don McCullough, a product-line manager for Broadband Technologies, Inc., noted that
"even ADSL could be seen as [a] quick-strike effort[ I by phone companies to get something
deployed soon, before ... cable modems are out there .... [T]elcos ... have to move ... to
challenge the cable industry on both Internet access and digital video. In some senses, it would
be good if the cable industry bloodies the telephone companies with cable modems to a certain
extent, so that they do not become complacent with first-generation ISDN or DSL architec-
tures." Wirbel, supra note 92, at 51; Brian Santo, Group Forming to Spread ADSL Gospel,
ELEC. ENGINEERING TIMES, Aug. 29, 1994, at 18 ("ADSL can be an important interim solution
for phone companies, allowing them to battle their cable competitors until they can install their
own switched, high-bandwidth networks."); see Edmund L. Andrews, Steep Hurdles to Web
Shortcut; Rapid-Access Computer Lines Are Stumbling over High Prices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25,
1996, at D1 (describing RBOC pricing and provision of ISDN services); Alan G. Hutcheson,
HDSL Turns Copper Cable into a Buried Treasure, TELEPHONY, Dec. 14, 1992, at 34 (discussing
the reasons behind deployment of HDSL technology by LECs); Bart Stuck, The Local Loop
Adapts for New Roles, Bus. COMM. REV., Oct. 1995, at 55, 56 (describing LECs' use of HDSL
and ADSL compression technologies to upgrade their copper network access facilities to carry
higher-bit-rate traffic).
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George Gilder has written persuasively about yet another technol-
ogy model.95 Building on the work of Paul Green at IBM Watson
Labs, Gilder predicts that the future is in all fiber networks. 96 He has
dubbed this the "dumb and dark" network.97 Built on the infrastruc-
ture of existing dark fiber (fiber already laid but not utilized) in the
long-distance network and dumb "switchless" routing, he hypothe-
sizes that the cost-reductions of moving bits will follow the same expo-
nential performance curves experienced in computing power and
memory.98
Whichever technological solution wins out, the result will almost
surely be a telecommunications infrastructure in which the cost of
moving bits will be driven down to the point that it becomes cheap or
perhaps virtually free to the consumer. An infrastructure based on
low cost, high capacity transport makes possible a network architec-
ture that resembles the World Wide Web more than existing cable
systems or planned OVS platforms.99 Intelligence will be at the fringe
of the network rather than being controlled by the conduit providers.
Customers will be able to seek out and download entertainment, in-
formation, and applications from thousands of sources rather than
from a preselected menu of channels. The chokehold on program-
ming by conduit providers, including broadcasters, will be over. Value
will be added by people with navigation tools and, most importantly,
by people who have something to say, draw, compile, print, or
produce.
Whether Congress, in passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
intended it or not, the market will drive the infrastructure towards
something resembling the Open Data Network vision embraced by
the National Research Council. 100 That vision included four network
characteristics: universal connectivity, competitive access for all infor-
mation providers, open standards for network interconnection, and a
95. George Gilder, Into the Fibersphere, FORBES ASAP, Dec. 7, 1992, at 111.
96. Id. at 112, 114-15.
97. Id. at 117.
98. Id. at 114. According to Gilder, "Just as the old IC [integrated circuit] made transistor
power virtually free, the new IC-the all-optical network-will make communications power
virtually free." Id. at 114. And by making communications power (i.e., bandwidth) nearly free,
the all-optical network or fibersphere will revolutionize the environment of all information in-
dustries and technologies. Id. at 125.
99. See Stewart Alsop, WebTV's Integration of Television and the Web Is Clever and Priced
Right, INrFOWORo, July 15, 1996, at 102 (describing WebTV, a low cost, consumer electronic
device that integrates television viewing and Web surfing); Webbed, ECONOMIST, Jan. 20,1996, at
82, 83 (discussing the broad potential that WebTV will have as transmission speeds improve).
100. NRENAISSANCE COMMITTEE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REALIZING THE INFOR-
MATION FUTURE: THE INTERNET AND BEYOND 3-4 (1994) [hereinafter INFORMATION FUTURE].
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network open to change, i.e., open to new applications and new
technologies. 101
The revolution has just begun. AT&T's offering of highly dis-
counted Net access through a flat rate for unlimited monthly use, as
well as free access for those who use it less than five hours per
month, 10 2 was met with a similar offer by MCI. 10 3 This is certain to
accelerate the need for more bandwidth. These companies' vision
makes possible constant on-line access at a reasonable price. And
that is only the beginning. On-line, all-the-time means an open door
to many time-sensitive Net uses, including instant e-mail and news up-
dates. Some software companies, like PointCast, plan to offer the
equivalent of screen savers that act as newspapers undergoing contin-
uous updates throughout the day.104
What is going to happen to the traditional carriers in this environ-
ment? Just as the 1980s was a pretty good decade for the mainframe
computer industry, the next ten years promise to be pretty good years
for the carriers. Through megamergers 05 and favorable regulatory
action,10 6 local exchange carriers are fighting to keep a strong hold on
their local markets and resulting profits. Local exchange carriers will
no doubt use what means they have to convince regulators that they
should resist the irresistible tide that is likely to deconstruct their in-
dustry. For example, in the wake of the AT&T Internet access an-
nouncement, the Regional Bell Operating Companies have
threatened to seek FCC approval of a new modem tax. 10 7 Currently,
FCC regulations prohibit local telephone companies from assessing a
101. Id. The proposed network will require an appropriate architecture. The Committee en-
visions a four-level layered system: The first level is the bit-level or bearer service realized out of
the lines, switches and elements of networking technology; the second level is the transport level
which can transform the bearer service into the infrastructure needed for higher level applica-
tions; the third level is the middleware or commonly used Internet functions; and the last level is
the applications through which users interact directly. Id. at 5. The Committee believes that
such a structure would permit fair and open competition between providers at each of the layers.
Id.
102. Kara Swisher, AT&T to Begin Offering Access to the Internet; Company Faces Wide
Range of Competitors, WASH. PosT, Feb. 28, 1996, at C3; John Markoff, Bell Companies Assail
AT&T's Internet Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 29, 1996, at D1, D5.
103. Mike Mills, MCI Offers Customers Free Internet Access; Plan Is Virtually Identical to
AT&T's, WASH. POST., Mar. 19, 1996, at C1.
104. Markoff, supra note 102, at D5.
105. See supra note 8 (describing several recent mergers).
106. Many state regulators have created local obstacles to open competition in local phone
service. For example, state law in Texas protects its local RBOC, Southwestern Bell, from
AT&T, Sprint, and MCI by prohibiting the use of RBOC lines by any company with over 6% of
the long distance market. Albert R. Karr, Texas Defies Washington in Phone Deregulation, Pro-
tecting Its Local Bell Against Giant Rivals, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1996, at A16.
107. Markoff, supra note 102, at D5.
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fee for computer modem connections.10 8 In response to the AT&T
plan and others that are sure to follow, the telcos are crying foul.
What happened to their lucrative access charges? Added to the LECs
threats are maneuvers by existing providers to stop the Net from serv-
ing as a platform for long-distance voice calls. America's Carriers
Telecommunications Association (ACTA), an association of small
long-distance carriers, has filed a petition with the FCC seeking regu-
lation of voice calls on the Net.'0 9
How the FCC handles these issues, along with the ability of the
Commission and state regulators to implement the interconnection
mandate of the 1996 Act, will determine the speed at which the tele-
phone, cable, and Internet-based networks converge into an open data
network. 110 The force of technology means that the inevitability of
this convergence is not really in question, but the pace of convergence
still rests with federal and state regulators. In grappling with the bliz-
zard of issues contained in the eighty-plus rulemakings the FCC is
mandated to undertake by the 1996 Act and the hundreds more going
on before state public utility commissions, it will be easy for regulators
to become snowblind. A few simple markers ought to help guide the
way.
First, regulators need to know what they are regulating. What regu-
latory paradigm are they adopting? Congress chose both deregulation
and competition as its goals. When those goals come in conflict, one
must be paramount. To realize the information future, an open net-
work and competition must be the foremost goal. In the near term,
that will mean that regulators may have to defer some deregulatory
actions and create strong enforcement mechanisms to police against
cross-subsidization and anti-competitive practices by the local ex-
change monopoly."' Second, regulators need to understand the
108. This telco attempt is really nothing new. The RBOCs have been trying, since the original
FCC ruling in 1983, to gain permission to charge computer connections in line with voice users.
The FCC refused to grant telco requests in 1987 and 1989, partly because of significant consumer
protest, but their decision a third time is far from a foregone conclusion. The FCC plans to
consider access charge reform as part of its ongoing implementation of the local competition
provisions of the 1996 Act. In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, (FCC) (CC No. 96-98) (Aug. 8, 1996),
at 9.
109. Petition for Declaratory Ruling, Special Relief, and Institution of Rulemaking, In re The
Provision of Interstate & International Interexchange Telecommunications Service Via the In-
ternet by Non-Tariffed, Uncertified Entities (FCC) (R.M. No. 8775).
110. INFORMATION FuTURE, supra note 100, at 34-36.
111. Comments of Alliance, supra note 48, at 2-3.
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Net.112 The Net is a world of abundance, not scarcity. Intelligence is
distributed to the outer edge, not controlled by the Central Planning
Committee. If one thinks of every bulletin board operator as a poten-
tial television programmer, the Net is a world of 15,000 channels of
television on demand, not 150 preprogrammed offerings. 113
Third, regulators must explicitly embrace the goal of providing
more, and cheaper, bandwidth to the home. Regulators will face this
decision directly by approving the pricing of ISDN offerings, deciding
whether to regulate Internet phone service, approving the buildout of
fiber networks and, more indirectly, by adopting regulations to make
OVS platforms truly open, certificating cable companies to provide
phone service and including high-end Internet services in the defini-
tion of universal service. In making each of these decisions, regulators
need to adopt a supply-side philosophy-make the transport of bits
cheap and fast, and new applications and consumer demand will
follow.
VII. CONCLUSION
If regulators can keep their eyes on the goal of creating a fast, uni-
versal, open data network, they can help make obsolete the cable-
telco squabbles that fueled a good part of the drive for the 1996 Act,
the provisions of the law that resulted, and indeed, their own roles in
setting the rules. The result would be a free market that valued con-
tent more than control. That would be a great public service.
112. Complete comprehension by regulators is absolutely critical. Regulators should take
note of the comprehensive exploration of the Internet undertaken by the court in ACLU v.
Reno. The court in Reno devoted 121 independently-numbered paragraphs in its Findings of
Fact to discussing at length how the Internet works and how cyberspace is used before eventually
holding unconstitutional two CDA provisions. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-49 (E.D.
Pa. 1996) (unanimous three-judge panel).
113. As Nicholas Negroponte has observed, Web TV will not only permit the cooking enthusi-
ast the option of tuning into Joyce Chen or Julia Child, depending on tonight's menu, but also
will permit a Greek-American to select the Greek regional channel covering her hometown.
NEGROPONTE, supra note 19, at 175-76.
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